Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Decisions in Art. 78 Proceedings

Article 78 Litigation Documents

September 2021

Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Rhames, Keith (2017-01-20)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd

Recommended Citation
"Decision in Art. 78 proceeding - Rhames, Keith (2017-01-20)" (2021). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/289

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Article 78 Litigation Documents at FLASH:
The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Decisions in Art. 78
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For
more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Matter of Rhames v New York State Bd. of Parole
2017 NY Slip Op 30143(U)
January 20, 2017
Supreme Court, Franklin County
Docket Number: 2016-471
Judge: S. Peter Feldstein
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and
local government websites. These include the New York
State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the
Bronx County Clerk's office.
This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.

[* 1]

STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
KEITH RHAMES, #90-T-3317,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2016-0303.62
INDEX #2016-471

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
____________________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Keith Rhames, verified on July 16, 2016 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s Office on August 3, 2016. Petitioner, who is currently an inmate
at the Collins Correctional Facility, challenges the denial of discretionary parole rendered
while he was an inmate at the Bare Hill Correctional Facility.
The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on August 8, 2016. The Court has received
and reviewed the Answer and Return together with a Letter-Memorandum of Christopher
J. Fleury, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, dated October 21, 2016, as well as confidential
materials for in camera review. No Reply has been received.
On October 17, 1990, petitioner was sentenced as a Second Felony Offender to an
indeterminate term of incarceration for twenty-five (25) years to life upon the conviction
following trial for the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, as well as concurrent terms
of seven and one-half (7½) to fifteen (15) years for the crime of Criminal Possession of a
Weapon in the Second Degree and three and one-half (3½) to seven (7) years for the crime
of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. On December 1, 2015, petitioner
re-appeared before the Parole Board for his second appearance having completed more
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than 25 years in custody. The Parole Board denied parole and made the following
determination:
“Parole is denied. After a review of the record and interview, the panel
has determined that if released at this time there is a reasonable probability
that you would not live at liberty without again violating the law.
This decision is based on the following factors:
The instant offense of Murder 2nd, and Criminal Possession of a
Weapon 2nd, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon 3rd, wherein you did cause
the death of an individual by shooting him.
Your record dates back to approximately 1985. It includes felonies and
misdemeanors as well as prior jail and failure at community supervision. You
have failed to benefit from prior efforts at rehabilitation.
Note is made by this board of your sentencing minutes, COMPAS Case
Plan, COMPAS Risk Assessment, rehabilitative efforts, letters of support
and/or reasonable assurance, disciplinary record, and all other required
factors.
Additionally, your release at this time would be incompatible with the
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as
to undermine respect for the law.”
Petitioner filed a timely appeal and the Parole Board’s determination was upheld by
the Administrative Appeals Unit in a written decision on or about June 13, 2016. Petitioner
timely commenced the instant action and argues that the Parole Board’s determination was
an abuse of its statutory discretion. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that the Parole Board
relied upon erroneous information regarding his underlying crime, to wit: that he followed
the victim into the building before shooting the victim and that the building in which the
crime occurred was a residence or apartment. The petitioner further argues that the Parole
Board failed to consider other statutory factors in making its determination while relying
to heavily upon the instant offense. The petitioner also asserts that the Parole Board’s
decision holding him an additional 24 months constitutes an improper re-sentencing.
Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed. Respondent asserts that
while the petitioner alleges that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous information, the
Parole Board relied upon the Pre-Sentence Report which it is mandated to do and the
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petitioner should have challenged the contents therein at the time of sentencing. See
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). Respondent also asserts that “the Court’s role is ‘not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported,
and not contradicted, by the facts in the record.’ ” Matter of Comfort v. New York State
Div. of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295 citing Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole,
119 AD3d 1268. Respondent argues that the Board considered all of the statutory
guidelines, including the COMPAS Risk Assessment instrument as indicated in the Board’s
decision. Finally, the respondent argues that the 24 month hold does not constitute a resentencing as the petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration as the
Board is vested with discretion to determine if and when parole would be appropriate.
As relates to the petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous
information, the petitioner expressed his disagreement with the factual recitation during
the hearing. Accordingly, the Parole Board did not include the factual recitation into the
determination. Nonetheless, if the petitioner contests the information in the Pre-sentence
Investigation Report, neither the Parole Board nor this Court can amend such report.
“Turning to petitioner's argument that the Board relied upon
erroneous information in denying his request for parole release, we note that
the Board was entitled to rely on the information contained in the
presentence investigation report, and petitioner is foreclosed from
challenging the accuracy of that report here, inasmuch as he failed to raise
such a challenge before the sentencing court.” Carter v. Evans, 81 AD3d
1031, 1031.
It is noted that during the Parole Board interview the petitioner clearly
communicated that while he did indeed shoot the victim, thereby causing his death, the
petitioner asserts that he did so in self-defense. Resp. Ex. F [3:8-9]. Additionally, the
petitioner denied that he followed the victim into the “housing project” and instead the
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petitioner alleged that the victim brandished a gun first. Resp. Ex. F [3:12-25; 4:1-11]. It
is further noted that at sentencing, the petitioner expressed his innocence as well as
indicated that he acted in self-defense. Resp. Ex. B [20:12-21]. Nonetheless, it does not
appear that the details of whether the petitioner followed the victim or if it occurred in an
apartment or housing project were relevant to the Parole Board’s determination as such
facts were not stated in the decision nor would the different details substantially alter the
underlying narrative of the crime for purposes of the parole hearing. See Carter v. Evans,
at 1032.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent failed to consider the statutory factors
contained in Executive Law §259-i(c)(A) and only focused on the petitioner’s underlying
crime. The petitioner further alleges that the Parole Board failed to specify the reasons for
denial and he asserts that the Parole Board failed to adequately explain how the record
before them showed the likelihood of the petitioner re-offending. The petitioner argues that
he will never be granted parole based upon the Parole Board’s reliance solely on the nature
of the instant offense and the Parole Board refused to advise him what, if anything, he
would need to do for future appearances before the Board as this is the second time he was
denied for the same reasoning.
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §§38-f
and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but
after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall
require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including
program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
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education, training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff
and inmates; ... (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the
inmate; ... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating
factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior
criminal record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to
any previous probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5)) unless there had been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268;
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
Petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary,” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
The petition focuses upon the argument that the Parole Board failed to adequately
consider/properly weigh all of the required statutory factors and instead relied excessively
on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior
criminal record. A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is
required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it
required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Montane v.
Evans, 116 AD3d 197; see also Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination:
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“. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant
factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory guidelines and
rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the facts
in the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process,
given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each
factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior
(internal citations omitted).” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole,
68 AD3d 1295, 1296.
In the case at bar, a review of the Parole Board Report and transcript of Petitioner’s
December 1, 2015 appearance before the Parole Board reveal that the Board had before it
information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including Petitioner’s
educational and therapeutic programming records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment
Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and letters of support regarding
release, as well as information with respect to the circumstances of the crimes underlying
his incarceration and prior criminal record. The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the
hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board denied the Petitioner an opportunity to
answer questions or provide insight into how and why he believed that he would be a good
candidate for release. However, the Parole Board also expressly considered that in the two
years since the last Parole Board appearance, the petitioner had received two (2) Tier III
violations and one (1) Tier II violation. In addition, while the petitioner had previously
completed the ART program, following the Tier III violations, the petitioner refused to
complete the ART program again despite the potential benefit of same before the Parole
Board interview.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of the discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
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determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s
incarceration and that the petitioner while he stated he was remorseful, still claimed
innocence. See Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 and Confoy v. New York State Division
of Parole, 173 AD2d 1014; see also Graziano v. Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [“ ‘while the
Board may not consider [ ] factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including
penal philosophy’, it can consider factors—such as remorse and insight into the
offense—that are not enumerated in the statute but nonetheless relevant to an assessment
of whether an inmate ‘present[s] a danger to the community.’ ”]
Notwithstanding the petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board’s denial of parole
is tantamount to re-sentencing, the argument is without merit. “[W]hile petitioner argues
that the Board improperly extended his 20-year minimum period of incarceration by
denying him parole, the Board was vested with the discretion to determine whether release
was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set this as the minimum
term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]).”
Cody v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1141, 1142.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

January 20, 2017 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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